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POST-SCANDAL ORGANIZATIONAL (DIS)ORDER
POST-SCANDAL ORGANIZATIONAL (DIS)ORDER: A GROUNDED THEORY
APPROACH SHIFTING FROM MURPHY’S LAW TO SAFER REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENTS
ABSTRACT

The literature shows that, in the wake of negative media exposition, organizations’ selfregulation tends to be strengthened. We investigate such motivation from the perspective of the
psychosocial consequences in executives’ and organizational self-confidence. A grounded theory
approach supports findings from 27 different events described by top-level executives from major
publicly traded organizations. Their testimonies document that scandalous episodes, when they occur,
leave a trauma footprint within the organizational and individual consciousness because of the
perceived post-event humiliation, remorse, guilt, and fear. The paradigm of reliance and trust in the
designed structures is severely altered. In turn, a climate of excessive self-regulation explains the
recovery from the traumatic experience. New boundaries for regulatory balance, also called “the
confidence zone,” exists until design changes coalesce with organizational blame to create the
perception that reputational safety has been achieved. Fears of subsequent media scrutiny are
mitigated by the perception of moral safety based on governance. Consequently, the over-regulatory
response comprises the organizations’ healing process as they recover from the psychosocial trauma
caused by media exposition.

Keywords: Organizational trauma; self-regulation; organizational change.

POST-SCANDAL ORGANIZATIONAL (DIS)ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Media scandals that jeopardize the reputations of major corporations occur constantly. They may
be directly caused by the corporations’ own actions or be triggered by external parties. Organizations
often respond to scandals by making public announcements citing the strengthening of their governance
environment (Chakravarthy, DeHaan, & Rajgopal, 2014; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012).
The argument is buttressed by the assertion that corporate governance conforms to best practices, such as
the framework articulated by bodies such as the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO, 2013).
Yet, the executives’ motivation for self-regulatory heightening and the forces behind this transformation
as companies’ officials warrants analysis.
Ample organizational change literature concentrates on understanding the metamorphic elements
involved in the (re)evolutionary process of business structures in non-scandal settings (e.g. Oreg, Vakola
& Armenakis, 2011; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). The narrative usually invokes forces against uncritical
organizational conformity or compliance (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). By condemning obsolescence,
internal adjustments to the regulatory design seek to offset environmental adversities (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984). For instance, after deficient financial performance, organizations revisit their strategies
and formulate improvement plans to turn hardships around (e.g. Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Oreg,
Vakola & Armenakis, 2011; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). In this case, operational evolution explains
executives’ motivations.
When the source of transformation emanates from a regulatory enactment, the internal efforts
may have more of a compliance orientation rather than functional significance. Under mandatory
pressures, complying with regulations becomes the primary driver in order to see that business stability
remains uncompromised (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). The implementation plan is executed
exhaustively, while it is unlikely that the strategic path will be closely reexamined (Tsoukas & Chia,
2002).
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These drivers –intentional or forced–are evidence of radical outcomes. What remains uncertain is
the connection between not-legally-binding forces (such as negative media events) with the reputational
restoring process once companies’ executives confront the negative media exposition. Moreover, since
society judges firms’ behavior, there is a reasonable doubt in connecting executives’ motivations and their
over-regulatory responsive efforts from the lens of organizational change and crisis management
literature.
The justification behind corporate officials’ reactions and the transformation that organizations
experience stimulate the primary and secondary research questions: (RQ1) What circumstantial factors
motivate executives’ over-regulatory efforts noticed in Zavyalova, et al. (2012) when the firms they work
for are involved in scandalous events? Moreover, (RQ2) what key transformations are experienced by
these organizations and its members as consequence of public scrutiny? To address such inquiries, this
study applies a grounded-theory methodological approach. Such qualitative methodology results
appropriate because of the need to draw a reality-based experiential abstraction from the lens of those
who were involved in the event. The gathered data comes from 27 testimonials that provided valuable
insights into individuals’ experiences, activities, or reactions as members of organizations who overcame
their companies’ media exposition.
The balance of the paper is organized into four sections: the first segment provides a brief
literature review to frame the central dimensions. The second details the research methodology. The third
section, reports the findings from the collected testimonials. The paper concludes with a broader
discussion of the issues presented by this research.
SELECTED LITERATURE
Scandals and its Social Dynamics
Traditional academic literature defines negative reputational events (commonly known as
“scandals”) in multiple ways. Media scandals may be the result of the intentional acts of individuals who
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do not share the organization’s concern over risky behaviors (Molotch & Lester, 1974). A different
perspective evolved the concept by adding unethical flaws or ”rotten apples” existing inside of
organizations (Cohen, 1993). Recently, Coombs & Tachkova (2019) complemented the definition of
scandals with the social outrage component demanding social restitution with an adverse verdict
exceeding the traditional communication crisis.
This manuscript defines scandals as a reputational threat that has materialized from the point of
view of stakeholders whereby they question the morality of the organizations. Reputational threats in this
sense denote unexpected events capable of endangering the trust that external observers normally accord
with organizations, replacing them with moral outrage and a demand for restoration (Coombs, 2007;
Coombs & Tachkova, 2019; Jimenez-Andrade & Fogarty, 2019).
Scandals are fed by the social attention they attract. Blair et al. (2006) refer to the allure of “sex
sells” to denote that news should have a provocative component to catch readers’ fascination. Media
make profits from disseminating corporate wrongdoings as part of their business model (Miller, 2006).
Their success is measured by their ability to create “sound bites” or “breaking news.” Press editorial
boards have a tendency to promote controversial and outrageous events in order to attract readers and,
therefore, fund their ongoing operations (Blair, Stephenson, Hill, & Green, 2006).
In the scandals setting, the intensity of media exposition magnifies the public’s perception of the
reputation of organizations. The impression that stakeholders receive could severely bias their judgments
(Gentzkow & Shapiro 2006). For example, when the media attention focus on negative behavior, the
social verdict ends condemning the firms, even when the reputational value is consistently positive
(Burden, 2002; Westphal & Deephouse, 2011; Maynard & Freese, 2012).
Organizational Trauma
Social image and reputational value of organizations are built and constructed over time
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Stakeholders’ verdicts to scandalous episodes reduce the levels at which
they bond with the organizations (Cohen, 1993). Signs of trauma in organizational consequence of intense
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media exposition vary from a decrease in economic interactions up to a complete withdrawal that could
jeopardize their financial stability (Jonsson, Greve, & Fujiwara-Greve, 2009). As sign of rejection,
consumers and suppliers may decrease or eliminate their business interactions with the exposed firm
(Demiroglu & James, 2010; Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997; Helm, 2007). Once broken the bond,
organizations confront the idea of never regaining their pre-event reputational value.
The loss in value of the firms’ social image translates quickly in an economic downturn in their
financial performance (Frandsen & Johansen, 2011). Shareholders and lenders in capital markets are also
forced to react in such scenarios to actual or expected securities price movements (Black, Carnes, &
Richardson, 2000; Chung, Eneroth, & Schneeweis, 2003). A persistently unattended event without an
effective intervention to restore the reputation could translates into the termination of the organization as
a viable entity (Molotch & Lester, 1974). The over exposition may lead to the business termination
(Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Suchman, 1995).
Despite the financial sustainability issues, organizational employees must also confront the media
exposition consequences in their working environments. Media crisis, at the human capital level,
negatively alters the affective, cognitive and behavioral reactions of its members (e.g. Coombs, 1998;
Korn & Einwiller, 2013; Mazzei, Kim, & Dell'Oro, 2012). Furthermore, intense media negative coverage
has profound emotional implications on employees compromising the bond between them and their
organization (Korn & Einwiller, 2013). However, as noticed by Korn & Einwiller (2013), employees
exhibit a tendency of positively copping with this crisis when the situation is promptly managed by the
organization.
Scandalous events challenge each firm’s responsiveness in the process of overcoming the social,
economic, and human resources setbacks. Prolonged optimal responses may force firms to absorb higher
unexpected costs such as additional litigation risks, liquidity issues, expensive debt, and/or loss in human
capital (Davies, Chun, da Silva, & Roper, 2004; Dellarocas, 2003; Keh & Xie, 2009; Kotha, Rajgopal, &
Rindova, 2001; Mahon & Wartick, 2003; Solove, 2007; Walsh, Mitchell, Jackson, & Beatty, 2009). The
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restoration of the reputational value becomes the highest priority to corporate executive personnel for
finding viable solutions to mitigate the unnecessary consequences of over exposition.
Executives’ Overcoming Incentives
Literature on financial and nonfinancial incentives help for explaining overall executives’
incentives. On the compensation side, there is an expectation that executives will efficiently address the
restoration process promptly and diligently because their personal financial interests are aligned with
those of the shareholders (Eisenhartd, 1989; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007). Nonfinancial literature,
such as is found on the subject of corporate citizenship, poses on executives’ responsibilities to perform
consciously independently of their economic compensation as the ‘right thing to do’ for shareholders and
stakeholders (Carroll, 1998; Fombrun, Gardberg, & Barnett, 2000; Gardberg, & Fombrun, 2006).
However, both streams (financial and nonfinancial) do not address the emotional component for
explaining executives’ behavior, which may arise because of media exposition as employees operating in
the organization.
Crisis communication literature provides some indicators of the emotional repercussions on
executives’ behavior. Zavyalova et al. (2012) explains that when executives are unusually intense with
press releases detailing procedural actions, they are exhibiting remorse of the wrongdoings. Major
environmental events tend to generate abnormal behaviors in companies’ agents: for example, in acquired
firms, post-acquisition events intensify executives’ perception of power and resistance (Pickering, 2017).
In managing crises, officers are more likely to reduce their stress levels by favoring innovation and
creativity in the repairing plan to mitigate existing ambiguity (Gaudenzi et al. 2015; Hegner, Beldad, &
Kraesgenberg, 2016; Wolbers, Boersma, & Groenewegen, 2018). Ethical failures (such as corruption)
may promote in corporate personnel a self-condemning psychological guilt (Smith-Crowe & Warren,
2014; Greenbaum, Bonner, Gray, & Mawritz, 2020). Consequently, there is a reasonable doubt as to
whether critical events will imprint in organizational officials’ psyches some conditioned response
mechanism, as it is stated in the primary research questions.
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Over-regulation Response
In lieu of the event, executive personnel acting as agents face the responsibility of offering
strategic responses to mitigate unnecessary costs. Crisis management literature argues a tendency of firms
to communicate publicly the endurance of corporate governance after negative press exposition (e.g.

Chakravarthy, DeHaan, & Rajgopal, 2014; Zavyalova, et al., 2012). Firms’ press releases include
enhancing Board of Directors independence, monitoring systems, employees’ turnover, transparency, and
internal controls (Chakravarthy, DeHaan, & Rajgopal, 2014).
Scholars have conducted several studies about the effectiveness of adhering to principles of overregulation. For example, depending on the board of directors’ composition, the likelihood of financial
statement fraud can be reduced (Beasley, 1996), and strengthening controls can inhibit managerial fraud
(Caplan, 1999). This is largely because, when governance brings its full attention to structural problems,
operational effectiveness increases (Schiehll, Lewellyn, & Muller-Kahle, 2017). It remains to be seen, and
presented as the secondary research question, whether the self-regulatory efforts are linked (and if so,
how) to the plausible effects that media exposure has on executives’ behavior.
METHODOLOGY
Most reputational studies explore scandals based on archival sources, usually supported by public
announcements data (Chakravarthy et al., 2014; Zavyalova et al., 2012). However, their conclusions are
detached from the emotional experiences of corporate personnel who live through the media events.
Organizations’ justification of their reactions is limited by the formal text of the announcement, making
peoples’ personal experiences practically invisible. Therefore, this research seeks to capture the less
public, less messaged experiences of key corporate personnel. An attempt to identify people employed
with organizations under continuous media scrutiny was made so that the individuals most familiar with
the reputational issues could be included (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990).
Although some studies implemented experiential field techniques, their conclusions are limited to
one specific organization as unit of analysis (Heugens, Van Riel, & Van Den Bosch, 2004). Such a design
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would severely narrow our appreciation of the role of the environment faced by decision-makers. In order
to avoid such limitations, the study collects testimonies from individuals of different organizations to
allow patterns to emerge. The exploratory methodological approach that analyzes real qualitative
experiences by comparing individuals’ experiences is grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The goal
is achieved by conducting semi-structured interviews with a consistent set of questions to theoretically
sampled individuals with similar contextual characteristics –such as roles, emotions, or familiarities, in
order to obtain a comparable set of data that allows behavioral patterns between them to be observed
(Charmaz, 2006).
Sampled individuals, who answered several open-ended questions in an interview format, worked
as executives for major publicly traded organizations in the U.S. securities market. This deems
appropriate because, as remarked by Treviño, den Nieuwenboer, Kreiner, & Bishop (2014), in the
experience of officers, their interventions mitigate firms’ reputational pressures in media crises.
Individuals’ roles and firms’ characteristics comply with the research objectives as argued by Morse
(2010): participants were fluent in English with limited cultural variations (U.S.-based firms), had
sufficient professional experience (an average of 16.5 years), had an equity-based compensation as part of
their salary packages, and were directly involved during the studied phenomenon. In addition, to be
eligible they must had active participation during the post-event organizational efforts with at least one
reputational duty as encouraged in academic literature (Khan, 2019; Treviño, et al., 2014). Testimonies
were collected using the snowball recruiting process.
A basic archival investigation was conducted before each interview. This validated that
participants would provide details of their own experiences in accordance to the media story. If
participants did not mention the reputational episode, it was asked directly as one of the probing questions
as can be observed in the Appendix A Interview Protocol. As anticipated, the gathered experiences were
rich and vast (Charmaz, 2006). Even though many examinations could be conducted, the analyzed data in
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this study primordially focused on the qualitative examination applicable only to the research questions
and its repercussions.
The final sample consisted of 27 individuals, each representing a different organization in these
industries: financial services, consumer goods, and professional services. Each group contained nine
participants. Participants signed informed consent agreements and were promised confidentiality as
approved by the institutional IRB. The companies sampled collectively exceeded $8.7 trillion in assets in
2015, and revenue for these companies (again, 2015) was $1.1 trillion. Based on data collected in 2016
and 2017, the average size in assets per organization was approximately $322 billion. Table 1 contains a
summary of interviewee characteristics.
[Insert Table 1 here]
The data was analyzed in three stages. The first stage consisted of open coding, done line-by-line
without any pre-determined coding and order (Glaser, 1992). Open codes then were compressed and
compared across participants’ responses into axial codes in the second stage. The compression stage
presented an intense comparative analysis between participants’ responses (Corbin & Strauss, 1998), from
which, 34 axial codes were drawn. The final stage includes the identification of the theoretical or selective
codes in a hierarchical abstract form. This selection emerges from observed patterns across participants’
testimonies (Corbin & Strauss, 1998). Inter-rater reliability consisted of a secondary blind coding process
of six interviews (three from each group) by a Ph.D. candidate. Coding differences represented less than
10 percent of the total, and the reconciliation process did not reflect major relevant differences. From this
exhaustive process, five main findings emerged.
Supplementary Analysis
To enhance the quality of the findings, a supplementary analysis is offered to triangulate findings
from two different qualitative researching methodologies (Denzin, 2007). This is achieved by contrasting
researchers’ manual coding results with those derived from automatic coding techniques following the
systematic triangulation protocol found in Flick (2004). The main objective is to compare whether the
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themes found by authors are consistent without their intervention. Because participants’ testimonies
contain an emotional component, their experiences also were analyzed using content and sentiment
analysis (Loughran & McDonald, 2016). This supplemental analysis offers an extra layer of reliability of
the presented findings.
Following the Loughran-McDonald word list and the software Nvivo Pro 12 (QSR International),
responses which lacked interviewer’s comments were subject to a textual analysis for automatic coding
(Loughran & McDonald, 2016). From this process, the text was transformed into two different outputs:
the sentiment of the text (sentiment polarity: positive, neutral, and negative with percentage of
confidence) and the words–content–which appeared most frequently in the text (frequency).
For the sentiment analysis, each transcribed testimony was partitioned into two segments: the
media events and the transformation processes. The media events refers to the times when participants
referred to the causes that triggered the event. The transformation processes encapsulated all the
subsequent events post-scandal described during the interviews. The outcome analysis produces the
sentiment polarity (positive, neutral, and negative) expressed as a percentage of confidence. Appendix B
contains some examples of interview excerpts noting their polarity and the percentage of confidence.
Findings from the sentiment analysis of the transcriptions help bolster the contextual validity of the
grounded-theory findings.
The content analysis of the transcribed text consists in observing the frequency (and relative
frequencies) of the three-word phrases repeated most often. Only the 10 most-repeated phrases are
included in the analysis, and their frequency of use contrasts with the grounded-theory comparative
themes to triangulate both findings. This taxonomic assessment (from manual and mechanical
methodologies) reinforces the validity of the line-by-line analysis and open-code compression during the
inductive qualitative process of the grounded-theory approach.
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FINDINGS
The central finding in this study evidences that the efficiency in the reputational recovery strategy
after scandalous episodes is mediated by the emotional trauma perceived by executives, and how these
influences the self-regulatory organizational response. The traumatic experience from psychosocial
factors echoes in their guilt and embarrassment due to media exposition. Because media events evidence
the vulnerability of possible governance design, executives’ faith in such structures is compromised;
excessive self-regulatory behavior counteracts this lost confidence as part of the recovery from the
traumatic experience. New boundaries of regulatory balance, or confidence zones, exist until
organizational design coalesces with organizational remorse to the extent that the perception of
organizational safety is achieved. Fears of subsequent media scrutiny are mitigated with the perception of
moral safety achieved by heightened from governance. Ample details of these findings are described in
the subsequent segments: grounded comparative findings followed by an automatic mechanical coding for
supplemental analysis.
Grounded-Theory Findings
Finding 1. Scandalous media episodes, when they occur, create trauma within the executive’s
consciousness, evoking emotions such as humiliation, remorse, guilt, and fear.
Although participants were asked for their experience as organizational members dealing with the
events, their immediate responses included a condescending tone. Instead of making a distinction between
the organization and themselves, testimonies embraced the consequences of the events as personal
failures. Because there is an association between the individuals and their organizations, executives
appropriate the wrongdoing as their own. In fact, in many cases, the distance between the participant and
the party driving the wrongdoing was substantially large, yet no clear separation divided the reputations
of participants and organizations. Four foci (emotional aspects) illustrate the executives’ perception
beyond the company’s reputational failure.
Finding 1.1. Shame and humiliation follows the event.
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Participants perceived a weakening of their reputations because of their firms’ media scrutiny.
Exposing the wrongdoing to public judgment led them to believe that members could be responsible,
either by causing it or not preventing it. The negative repetition of the firms’ name also constitutes
damage to members’ reputations. Participants justified the perceived humiliation with testimonies such as
these:
People were embarrassed. It was a huge catalyst. [Company name omitted] is a company, but it's
made up of humans, and people take pride in what we do at work. Many of the executives didn't
know what was happening but they’d had to deal with that.
An alternative participant explained the collectively perceived shame as follows:
I want others to view us in a good light. I certainly don't want anything negative out there said
about our company or any bad light shined upon us out there. But it happened. We as members
have a reputation piece and it was jeopardized. We needed to make money but our reputation
extends beyond just shareholders.
Finding 1.2. Remorse and blame for not doing what should have been done prevail.
Executives challenge their actions as members of the organizations because of their ethical
compasses. Although participants were unlikely to have been the sources of the events, they associated
personal negligence to a failure to prevent the happenings. Because of the existence of in-place systems,
the threat-detection mechanisms alerted people to the sources of the scandals, but the human component
failed to intervene effectively. Consequently, there is a widespread feeling of failing a moral and
operational responsibility to protect the organizations’ integrity. Here is one testimony from one
participant in the pharmaceutical industry explaining an ignored alert:
There was definitely a reputational impact there, where we have to make sure that we market to
customers appropriately because events drive panic. Events can drive a mindset. Events can drive
consumers to disengage with your brand because of an incident. Before that, it was just a flag and
we successfully ignored it.
Even staff who had exhibited ethical thinking about organizational behavior prior to the events
felt remorse. The rationale seen in these testimonies applied also to the acknowledgement of the
responsibility. None of the participants indicated indifference or avoidance to the exposition, and
individuals’ attitudes were loaded with moral arguments. The sense of duty and blame is evident in
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testimonies such as, this: “You can't just take the positive pieces of being a global company and making a
lot of money without taking accountability for everything else that comes with that.”
Finding 1.3. Collective guilt compounded the unexpected damages.
In a similar vein, executives condemned their own actions as having caused damage. Testimonies
did not attempt to claim any innocence; instead, the participants refer to a shared sense of guilt about the
consequences of the event. The complexity of the events often resulted in severe and unexpected side
effects, for which companies’ officials claimed culpability and collectively accused themselves. For
example, one participant said, “Somebody got hurt. People were seriously injured because of us.” Another
testimony detailed sentenced the ethical liability in the following way:

Because whether or not we owned those facilities, we probably drove close to 50% to 70% of the
business that was done out of them, so we're accountable. What we had to do was first just stop
and say we're accountable.
Finding 1.4. Executives fear losing everything they have built over the years.
Participants emphasized both the importance of the reputation-building process and the fragility
of it. In this sense, the experiences influence executives’ and firms’ futures because the mistrust could
spread widely among stakeholders. Executives exhibited emotional fear that the events could
disproportionally alter future expectations in negative ways. One participant observed the following:
If you don’t trust me, then I will not sell any business and I won’t have a job, so reputation is
absolutely critical.

Neither ignorance nor carelessness about their reputation was present in the testimonies. Their
stories already spoke to the value of constructing reputability. One participant noted, “We want very
much for people to have a positive association with the name of our firm when you hear it, and we are
worried after that about any foreseeable outcome where our name is associated with something bad.” To
them, fear of losing the shared reputations of both the organization and the individual created the most
concern. To illustrate this reaction to wrongdoing and the fear of losing their reputation, one of the
participants related the following:
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Imagine if you continue business as usual with a corrupted client, people ... And it's common to
believe that the company that is selling their products as usual is corrupted, as well, because you
need to be concerned about how they are managing their business and how this impacts you.
Finding 2. The paradigm of reliance and trust in the designed structures is severely challenged.
Testimonies correlated with a variety of corporate scandals: there was no single unique source.
However, a pattern of failure evidences vulnerabilities in the organizational design. Therefore,
executives’ confidence in internal structures is severely compromised. They no longer trust in the
company’s ability to offer the needed protection to perform their routine activities. Weakness was
attributed to the ability to detect and monitor irregular behaviors along with unenforced or restricted
ethical environments that inhibit misbehavior.
The failure of detection and monitoring systems provides an alternative source of events. Here,
organizations’ structure for detecting potential process flaws did not function as expected, and did not
reveal inconsistencies above normal levels. This situation allows an external individual or entity to first
detect the abnormality, then make an early release of information to the public. The detection failure
could be found in a quality or safety control at any moment across the productive process. The common
pattern was to refer to it as “a safety issue” or “an evaluation system [that] failed on that component.” One
person even expressed, “We don't know how it came out in the media.”
Similar to a detection failure, monitoring systems can also fail in alerting organizations regarding
a potential threat. The source of this could derive from an employee, supplier, customer, or anyone with
corrupt intentions. Scandals occur because organizations fail to anticipate the potential for misbehavior,
which quickly translates into the inability to observe misbehavior until it has taken place. One interviewee
in the services industry described when the board of directors disregarded the early stages of the CEO's
odd actions. Another participant’s organization (in consumer goods) did not notice the main supplier’s
human resources misconduct in Asia. A financial institution ignored information previously reported by
lower-level executives. A different participant in the financial system neglected to inspect a customer who
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would later be labeled as a terrorist and the beneficiary of money laundering. Organizations failed to
detect and observed the tell-tale behaviors which, in retrospect, seem very obvious.
Most scandals have a component of ethical transgression, which is more likely to trigger public
attention and to create a demand for wide-net retribution and accountability. However, the difference
between actual scandals and those successfully prevented resides in the application and enactment of
ethical principles. In environments where ethical concerns are lax, unenforced ethical codes encourage
internal trespassers. Ethically restricted environments also offer greater exposure to outsiders’
misconduct. One participant’s testimony from a consumer goods company said, “Our biggest client had
this scandal in which some of their managers and senior managers were accused of corruption.” The
organization was tarnished due to “guilt by association.” Another example occurred to one participant
from the financial services industry: “One of our joint ventures was accused of money laundering.” As a
result, his organization became the public face of the scandal, as did three consumer goods companies
which experienced similar situations with suppliers in Asia. Before the scandal, all of these organizations
had displayed limited concern regarding ethics and had restricted attention to the ethical behavior of their
partners.
Some companies experienced scandals due to regulatory compliance issues, since organizations
decide internally whether to comply rigorously or minimally. The latter approach, by organizations
overwhelmingly focused on achieving competitive advantages, can be said to have triggered these
compliance scandals: the pursuit of such advantages created incentives for unethical behavior. A “play by
the line” attitude, focused on doing only what is expressly required for compliance, increased the
participants’ public opinion exposition. This is especially problematic in areas where the “line” that
separates legal and illegal is obscure. For example, one participant in the financial services field described
this issue:
A few years ago, we were fined by the Commission [European Competition Commission] for
antitrust violation by one of our portfolio companies. By following up [referring to the fine] on
the developments in various compliance fields, including anti-competition…
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Testimony from a participant from the professional services industry revealed this: “The client
was accused of abusive tax shelters, but the authorities blamed us as a firm, so the media did, too.”
Another participant from financial services mentioned, “The government fined us because our clients
used our services for illicitly transporting their products.” Her organization had only randomly complied
with federal regulations. Citing a similar case, another financial services participant said, “We didn´t track
the money before.” Consequently, the bank was accused of money laundering.
A brief example of the lack of trust in the systems in place at the time is the following testimony:
So I'm not saying it would prevented those issues, but it could surely helped to detect them, to
come forward early in the process, so that people know that they can come to us if there is an
issue so that we can help them and also try to assess our own situation.
The failure of such lax systems to detect promptly threats before they come to the attention of
outsiders means that executives lose faith in them. One participant expressed this concern by saying, “If
you don’t trust me, then I will not sell any business and I won’t have a job.” Another testimony stated,
“Sales people do not know the concept or are not aware of things that they do that are contrary to the
law.” Similarly, another testimony included this: “We needed to understand if the buyer was trustworthy
or not.” Consequently, the paradigm that the system will serve as a shield no longer applies in executives’
minds.
Finding 3. An attitude of excessive self-regulation in the reputational value creation acts as catalyst
for rebuilding the confidence as a recovery measure from the dramatic experience.

The event-responsive mechanism aids the self-trust recovery. Executives no longer feel safe with
existing structures: there is a widespread perception of lack of control because systems failed to handle
properly a reputational threat. The most they can do to restore some of the lost confidence is to erect
defensive mechanisms against scandals. Participants review their systems process like this:
Something wrong happened along the way. In order to be sure, you needed to stop, then be sure
that everything was okay, that you were doing nothing wrong, and then you could evaluate if you
wanted to continue doing business with this client.
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Another participant similarly expressed the assessing efforts within the company to test the
installed protocols for reinforcing the reliance in the structures or readapting them, as verse:
Processes were revised, like with a big lens to make sure that we weren’t doing businesses in the
wrong way. All processes were revised.
Testimonies referenced the fact that some systems are considered essential to protecting the firm.
For example, the representative of one firm said it focused on enduring the tightened customer service
quality control mechanisms. Those who had experienced technological breaches strengthened the alerts
issued by their detection systems:
Safety is now spread through not only, it's focused on not only within our company but also
people outside of our company. Vendors, for instance. We ensure that they are, whenever they
board our boats or are doing work on our boats, we ensure that they're abiding by all our safety
rules and regulations.
The over-regulatory efforts concentrate on repairing the confidence. By removing potential
doubts about vulnerability, the systems’ expected reaction is to defend against future perpetrators. The
self-protective process creates an aggressive, all-inclusive system that seeks to anticipate threats and
leaves little room for error, even if this means reducing or decreasing business interactions. To illustrate
this, one testimony explained, “Along with that is a code of conduct expectation. We expect them to
behave a certain way, and if they don't, contracts can be voided.” Another participant related the
following:
One thing is that it is new, and I will say happened in the last couple of months is, a policy on
what we deem as high-risk organizations and so trying move away from those types of things,
like the payday lenders or things of that sort, and of course adhering to all of the various policies
and procedures and regulations.
The pattern in participants’ experiences show a lower tolerance for possible failures. The
skepticism about “leaving things to chances” or to “a reasonable likelihood approach” turns into more
prospective and objective behavior. The justification is to leave unnecessary or relevancy-ignored risks
out of the system process. Potential failures became legitimately relevant, and assurance becomes a
priority to eliminate future regrets.
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This compliance program is indeed kind of a way to, even if they don't prevent the issues, that
they change a bit the focus, or at least it can help portfolio companies to understand that these
kinds of activities are not allowed. I mean, even assuming that the activities that were employed
were not allowed. So I'm not saying it will prevent those issues, but it can surely help detect
them, to come forward early in the process, so that people know that they can come to us if there
is an issue so that we can help them and also try to assess our own situation.
A firm that suffered from an international corruption event, and endured the monitoring behavior
of associated members, led its participant to describe the following:
We're continuously assessing our executives to make sure they're in compliance with the
regulations to behave ethically to maintain our reputation. Everybody has to acknowledge every
year. We have trainings. We are now deploying, rolling out, a compliance training online
regarding certain code of conduct issues.
In the participants’ testimony, key transformation catalysts refer to the highest reputational
vulnerability in their value creation process. For example, since the media exposition includes customers’
data security breaches, one participant explained the process of protecting the information technology
systems as following:
Due to all of the data breaches we've had in various companies, the compliance is now a
requirement or necessity, to protect the customers' data even more rigorously.
Over-regulatory efforts are not limited to the organization as an isolated business unit. The
compliance adherence attitude include also their key stakeholders as part of the organizations’ efforts.
This is because although the company was not necessarily liable for the event, not including them may
aggravate the ongoing incident. Subsidiaries, commercial partners, customers, suppliers, and capital
providers lead some of the common referrals in participants’ testimonies. A participant whose company
experienced a major reputational event (financial fraud allegations concerning an acquired firm)
commented on the inclusive scope of systems’ endurance as follows:
Deriving from that, we started to build a framework whereby we would collect certain policies,
we would collect ways to establish a compliance program, for our portfolio companies. So we
tried to develop a standard, well, a framework of certain basic policies that we collected
throughout our service providers, on the Internet, what have you, and we tried to give them the
bricks to build their own compliance program.
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Reputational value protection stimulates preventive proactive efforts to include in their
compliance scope those who could compromise subsequent similar events. A participant from a company
that had incurred money-laundering accusations where one of their clients was responsible experienced
the following transformation:
There are a lot of things in place that people who are our customers should adhere to once they
are on boarding a customer. Now we need to know what they are doing, to make sure that there is
nothing illegal.

Finding 4. New boundaries of regulatory balance, or a confidence zone, exists until design changes
coalesce with organizational blame to the extent that the perception of safety is achieved.

The event, as a source of change, causes a chain reaction in terms of the willingness to improve
system structures; however, the desired transformation envisioned a more responsible and conscious
organization. Over-regulation helps to raise confidence by reordering system structures. For example, the
enhancement monitoring or detecting mechanisms help companies feel less vulnerable to being unaware
of potential flaws. Relieving the mistrust becomes the target goal. The perceived confidence after updates
have been made can be seen in the following testimony:
Today, the company is very good about ensuring that managers are aware of who's completed the
training early and who still has to complete the training to ensure that everyone completes the
training before the deadline. Not only is it the middle manager who may receive the report, but
also the executive of the organization may receive the report so that they know that these
individuals still need to take the training.
Testimonies refer to an acquired or rebooted level of confidence that their duties can be
performed with some level of trust. They rely on the system to protect them from similar events, and
know that system failures may have severe consequences. This evolved system may or may not contain
elements similar to the previous one. Only those that passed the scrutiny of the new paradigm (the safety
net) would remain or be enhanced. Those lacking protective reputational mechanisms were installed. To
illustrate this, one testimony cites the following:
It wasn't just a matter of, for us, shifting what was happening in that plant, right? That's very
important. Then there's also, what does that say about the mindset that we had, right? So how do
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you take that incident and start to create a lens around other things that may also cause consumers
to think about your company differently?
In their experience, if the problem source possessed some element of social responsibility, the
new confidence would reflect that:
Then, corporate responsibility also had its place in areas like diversity, inclusion, etc., but that's
one of the biggest things that happened was this corporate responsibility leadership.
The media exposition crisis opened a window of opportunity to revalue the installed environment,
and some transformative governance efforts included a recalibration of moral foundations. Organizations
had the chance to expand their vision from purely financial considerations to encompass ethical standards.
The ultimate goal become the improvement of their own confidence in the system. One participant
explained that his company’s confidence was supported by more sophisticated and evolved structures:
Nowadays we have and enforce five core values because they are a big part of who we are in
defining our identity and how we can quote ourselves. The first one is integrity. Integrity to us
means no lies or secrecy, so we deal with information and we want to communicate with you in a
way that we don’t withhold information and we don’t tell you something that we know to be
untrue and we think that is the foundation of any sort of long-term relationship. The absence of
integrity in a business model is going to fail. The second of five is “the Golden Rule,” so I want to
treat you in a way that I would like to be treated and we want to make sure that there is a
symmetrical relationship and we get along. The third core value is excellence which means, to us,
continuous improvement. We have to get better. The fourth is objectives. We get very clear about
what we are trying to accomplish. The fifth is profits: if we don’t make money, we are out of
business. So, these core values guide our behaviors and, of the five, the most important is
integrity.
Finding 5. Fears of subsequent public scrutiny are mitigated by improved governance.
Following the events, organizational personnel often feel keenly aware of the scrutiny they
receive from outside observers. Seemly, organizations imprint in executives’ mindsets the fear of social
judgment from media exposition. In the testimonies, the news is referred to as a vehicle for harming
reputational value when the information that they receive is not adequately channeled. Improved control
systems contained contingency plans for providing users certain reliability on the redesigned processes,
including communication strategies. This offers users certain reliance on the structures and the safety net
that allows them to thrive and move forward. Testimonies eloquently describe their moral safety net as
follows:
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There's continuously media coverage of [company name redacted]. I'm not really sure we
continuously, we're a public company so we're continuously being scrutinized. There is no one
singular thing. Every day, we're in the news. But we are doing the right thing.
The delicacy of large multinational organizations’ reputations, especially when subjected to
media exposure, forces organizational members to find new comfort levels in their governing structures.
To such an extent, participants refer to an evolution of media control that is justified by the fear of further
scrutiny. The awareness of the reputational value is widespread across the organization. Their alternative
is relying on their governing systems and structures:

My company can often attract those who are boycotting or picketing outside of the company's
main headquarters. It's easy to get caught in that frame, but again, the company executives
continue to stress the importance of not speaking to the media. The company, if there's any type
of media event, the appropriate executive communicates to all executives that it's very important
for us not to speak to the media but to direct them to our corporate communications organization.
Another participant likewise referred to the stress of attention attracted by their type of
organization and the type of event which occurred. Therefore, there is a blind trust in the collective effort:
because the reputational damage could spread internally, members of the organization believe it will
execute oversight functions better than anyone else could.
I will say, this particular instance received a lot of media. With all of the media attention, negative
media attention that this change received. In terms of the media, the company is trying to ensured
or at least ... I won't say “ensure.” The company has made an effort to communicate to executives
about how we should conduct our self with the media.
Mechanic Findings: Coding Supplemental Analysis
In order to increase the quality and reliability of the findings, transcribed responses received
additional textual analysis. Table 2 displays the sentiment analysis results using the automatic coding
methodology for capturing the emotional components of the text. Findings show that, overall, the 27
interviews are highly mixed: negative (56%), positive (36%), and neutral (38%). The experiential
narrative revealed that interviewees perceived the events as overwhelmingly negative: 66% viewed it as
such, while only 16% saw it positively and 28% viewed it neutrally.
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Where testimony described the change in their organizations, the optimistic word usage increased
drastically: 55% reported feeling positively; 48%, negatively; and 44%, neutrally. This analysis supports
the theoretical logic: companies first suffer media exposure that participants experience negatively, and
then positive counter-measures appear. This supports the manuscript central idea that executives suffered
traumatically but subsequently adapted.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Grounded-theory findings were triangulated with a content analysis of the transcriptions. The
objective is to assess whether line-by-line coding reveals repetitions across participants’ testimonies. The
three-word phrases repeated most often (the top 10 times) were compared with the five main findings
(and their sub-levels). Table 3 presents the triangulation results. From this, it can be seen that each one of
the grounded-theory findings matches with participants’ most frequently repeated phases.
[Insert Table 3 here]
DISCUSSION
The gathered testimonies offer a plausible explanation to the post-scandal executives’ overregulatory efforts documented in academic literature (Chakravarthy, et al., 2014; Zavyalova, et al., 2012).
Findings suggest that the exposition caused by media episodes trigger an abnormal self-regulatory
response, not because of the public demand, but because of a loss of confidence in structures designed to
prevent such mishaps. The perceived emotional traumatic experience forces self-regulatory strategic
reactions for containing and overcoming the reputational episode. As a chain reaction, a transformational
process accelerates the redesign of internal governance creating a safer working environment for
executives to operate. These findings have multidimensional implications for the literature found in
organizational change, crisis management, social identity theory and executives’ incentives.
In the organizational change theoretical framework, these study findings argue that the
governance evolution consequence of the executives’ trauma from scandals represent also a source for
organizational transformation. Traditional managerial models introduce as changing forces the reluctance
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of obsolescence and the mandatory compliance (e.g. Oreg, Vakola & Armenakis, 2011; Tsoukas &

Chia, 2002). These two, however, rely on the absence of negative media exposition. In Zavyalova, et al.,
(2012), it is noticed the relationship between media corporate wrongdoings and over-regulatory efforts
leaving unexplored the behavioral component of firms’ executives for justifying their reaction. This study
expands such a relationship, arguing that the governance strengthening reaction represents the actual
overcoming reputational efforts strategically designed by executives. The implication of this argument
would place scandals into a third category for a source for organizational metamorphism promoted by the
reputational restoration process.
Within the crisis communication arena, theorists include in their conceptual models the relevance
of the strategic response for overcoming scandalous events at the minimal possible cost (Frandsen &
Johansen, 2011). The theoretical approach emphasizes that the diminishment of reputational value comes
from unnecessary over-exposition (e.g. Coombs & Tachkova, 2019). In this study, the main findings
argue that the efficiency in the repairing process is mediated by executives’ perceived emotional trauma
from the influence of psychosocial factors such as guilt, remorse humiliation and fear because of the
reputational exposition.
In terms of social identity theory, the observed trauma-related sings in executives’ experiences
provides evidence regarding the reputational bond between organizations and its executives. As
conceptualized in King & Whetten (2008), organizations develop reputational-value strategies based on
connecting individual and shared identities where both parties (executives and firms) can witness and take
profits on its intangible benefits –for example achieving long-term ideal goals. In this sense, findings
suggest that the value of the connection also creates an automatic responsive mechanism during
scandalous episodes because the reputational damages are also shared.
In terms of financial and non-financial incentives, there is a reasonable expectation that
executives will act as guardians of the best interests of their organizations in the scandals recovery
process (e.g. Eisenhartd, 1989; Fombrun, et al., 2000; Gardberg, & Fombrun, 2006). Instead, the gathered

22

POST-SCANDAL ORGANIZATIONAL (DIS)ORDER
testimonies provide an alternative explanation for executives’ reaction. Operational safety and systems
reliance motivate new boundaries for self-regulatory balance. For corporate officials, the key behavioral
stimuli represents the reconstruction of the confidence zones where they operate. The improvement of the
in-placed structures, that proved them feeble causing the public exposition, represents their highest
priority in the reputational value restoring process.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
This manuscript has several implications for executives currently professionally practicing in
terms of overcoming reputational events. Executives could take profits from this manuscript by including
in their strategic recovering plans the prompt enhancements to their governance structures. Adding
systemic improvements would accelerate the recuperation of the firms’ reputational value and assist with
the emotional recovery.
Since the research design is an exploratory methodology based on an inductive comparative
process based on grounded theory, a pattern of perceived traumatic experiences emerges because of the
unwelcome exposure. In the psychological literature, “traumatic events” usually refers to events such as
war, collective torture, or violence (Blanchard, 1996). Moreover, although this piece could also have
implications in this psychological realm, the overall research objectives pursues the theoretical
conceptualization in the managerial context solely.
This research content focuses only on the motivation behind a specific organizational response; it
does not attempt to make any clinical analysis regarding individuals experiencing Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD). Furthermore, the overall material should not be taken out of the research context that
lays out how organizations respond to media scandals, and without the limitations of using qualitative
data from actual testimony. It is strongly recommended to proceed with caution based on this important
limitation.

23

POST-SCANDAL ORGANIZATIONAL (DIS)ORDER
REFERENCES
Armenakis, A. A., & Bedeian, A. G. (1999). Organizational change: A review of theory and research in
the 1990s. Journal of management, 25(3), 293-315.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and
financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review: 443-465.
Beatty, R. P., & Ritter, J. R. 1986. Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing of initial public
offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 15(1): 213-232.
Black, E. L., Carnes, T. A., & Richardson, V. J. 2000. The market valuation of corporate reputation.
Corporate Reputation Review, 3(1): 31-42.
Blanchard, E. B., Jones-Alexander, J., Buckley, T. C., & Forneris, C. A. (1996). Psychometric properties
of the PTSD Checklist (PCL). Behaviour research and therapy, 34(8), 669-673
Caplan, D. 1999. Internal controls and the detection of management fraud. Journal of Accounting
Research: 101-117.
Carroll, A. B. 1998. The four faces of corporate citizenship. Business and society review, 100(1), 1-7.
Cohen, D. V. 1993. Creating and maintaining ethical work climates: Anomie in the workplace and
implications for managing change. Business Ethics Quarterly, 3(04): 343-358.
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). 2013. Internal ControlIntegrated Framework. Jersey City, NJ: AICPA.
Coombs, W. T. 1998. An analytic framework for crisis situations: Better responses from a better
understanding of the situation. Journal of public relations research, 10(3), 177-191.
Coombs, W. T. 2007. Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: The development and
application of situational crisis communication theory. Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3): 163176.
Coombs, W. T., & Tachkova, E. R. (2019). Scansis as a unique crisis type: Theoretical and practical
implications. Journal of Communication Management.
Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. 1998. Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing
grounded theory: Sage publications. London UK.
Chakravarthy, J., DeHaan, E., & Rajgopal, S. 2014. Reputation repair after a serious restatement. The
Accounting Review, 89(4): 1329-1363.
Charmaz, K. 2006. Constructing grounded theory. Sage publications. London UK.
Chung, S. Y., Eneroth, K., & Schneeweis, T. 2003. Corporate reputation and investment performance: the
UK and US experience. Research in International Business and Finance, 17: 273-291.

24

POST-SCANDAL ORGANIZATIONAL (DIS)ORDER
Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M. (2007). 1 the fundamental agency problem and
its mitigation: independence, equity, and the market for corporate control. The Academy of
Management Annals, 1(1), 1-64.
Davies, G., Chun, R., da Silva, R. V., & Roper, S. 2004. A corporate character scale to assess employee
and customer views of organization reputation. Corporate Reputation Review, 7(2): 125-146.
Dellarocas, C. 2003. The digitization of word of mouth: Promise and challenges of online feedback
mechanisms. Management Science, 49(10): 1407-1424.
Demiroglu, C., & James, C. M. 2010. The role of private equity group reputation in LBO financing.
Journal of Financial Economics, 96(2): 306-330.
Denzin, N. K. (2007). Triangulation. The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology.
Dollinger, M. J., Golden, P. A., & Saxton, T. 1997. The effect of reputation on the decision to joint
venture. Strategic Management Journal, 18(2): 127-140.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management review,
14(1), 57-74.
Flick, U. (2004). Triangulation in qualitative research. A companion to qualitative research, 3, 178-183.
Fombrun, C., & Foss, C. (2004). Business ethics: Corporate responses to scandal. Corporate Reputation
Review, 7(3), 284-288.
Fombrun, C. J., & Shanley, M. (1990). What's in a name? Reputation building and corporate strategy.
Academy of Management Journal, 33(2): 233-258.
Fombrun, C. J., Gardberg, N. A., & Barnett, M. L. (2000). Opportunity platforms and safety nets:
Corporate citizenship and reputational risk. Business and society review, 105(1), 85-106.
Frandsen, F., & Johansen, W. (2011). The study of internal crisis communication: towards an integrative
framework. Corporate Communications: An International Journal.
Gaudenzi, B., Confente, I., & Christopher, M. (2015). Managing reputational risk: Insights from an
European Survey. Corporate Reputation Review, 18(4), 248-260.
Glaser, B. G. (1992). Basics of grounded theory analysis: Emergence vs forcing. Sociology press. Mill
Valey, CA.
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative
research. Aldine, Chicago, IL.
Greenbaum, R., Bonner, J., Gray, T., & Mawritz, M. (2020). Moral emotions: A review and research
agenda for management scholarship. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 41(2), 95-114.
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1984). Structural inertia and organizational change. American sociological
review, 149-164.

25

POST-SCANDAL ORGANIZATIONAL (DIS)ORDER
Hegner, S. M., Beldad, A. D., & Kraesgenberg, A. L. (2016). The impact of crisis response strategy, crisis
type, and corporate social responsibility on post-crisis consumer trust and purchase intention.
Corporate Reputation Review, 19(4), 357-370.
Helm, S. 2007. The role of corporate reputation in determining investor satisfaction and loyalty.
Corporate Reputation Review, 10(1): 22-37.
Heugens, P. P., Van Riel, C., & Van Den Bosch, F. A. (2004). Reputation Management Capabilities as
Decision Rules. Journal of Management Studies, 41(8): 1349-1377.
Jimenez-Andrade, J. R., & Fogarty, T. J. (2019). Skin in the game? Experimental reactions to prospective
reputational damage by corporate personnel. Corporate Governance and Sustainability Review,
3(2), 54-63.
Khan, S. (2019). Chief Reputation Officer (CRO): Envisioning the Role. Corporate Reputation Review,
1-14.
Keh, H. T., & Xie, Y. (2009). Corporate reputation and customer behavioral intentions: The roles of trust,
identification and commitment. Industrial Marketing Management, 38(7): 732-742.
King, B. G., & Whetten, D. A. (2008). Rethinking the relationship between reputation and legitimacy: A
social actor conceptualization. Corporate Reputation Review, 11(3), 192-207.
Kotha, S., Rajgopal, S., & Rindova, V. 2001. Reputation building and performance: An empirical analysis
of the top-50 pure internet firms. European Management Journal, 19(6): 571-586.

Loughran, T., & McDonald, B. (2016). Textual analysis in accounting and finance: A survey. Journal of
Accounting Research, 54(4), 1187-1230.
Mahon, J. F., & Wartick, S. L. (2003). Dealing with stakeholders: how reputation, credibility and framing
influence the game. Corporate Reputation Review, 6(1): 19-35.
Mazzei, A., Kim, J. N., & Dell'Oro, C. (2012). Strategic value of employee relationships and
communicative actions: Overcoming corporate crisis with quality internal communication.
International Journal of Strategic Communication, 6(1), 31-44.
Molotch, H., & Lester, M. (1974). News as purposive behavior: On the strategic use of routine events,
accidents, and scandals. American Sociological Review: 101-112.
Morse, J. M. (2010). Sampling in grounded theory. The SAGE handbook of grounded theory, 229-244.
Oreg, S., Vakola, M., & Armenakis, A. (2011). Change recipients’ reactions to organizational change: A
60-year review of quantitative studies. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 47(4), 461524.
Pickering, M. E. (2017). Post‐acquisition integration processes in publicly owned professional service
companies: Senior professional behaviour and company performance. Journal of Organizational
Behavior, 38(7), 950-976.

26

POST-SCANDAL ORGANIZATIONAL (DIS)ORDER
QSR international (2018), Nvivo Plus Version12. [computer software] Australia
Rogerson, W. P. (1983). Reputation and product quality. TheBell Journal of Economics: 508-516.
Sellnow, T. L., & Seeger, M. W. (2013). Theorizing crisis communication (Vol. 5). John Wiley & Sons.
Solove, D. J. 2007. The future of reputation: Gossip, rumor, and privacy on the Internet. Yale University
Press.
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of
Management Review, 20(3): 571-610.
Schiehll, E., Lewellyn, K. B., & Muller-Kahle, M. I. (2018). Pilot, pivot and advisory boards: The role of
governance configurations in innovation commitment. Organization Studies, 39(10), 1449-1472.
Treviño, L. K., den Nieuwenboer, N. A., Kreiner, G. E., & Bishop, D. G. (2014). Legitimating the
legitimate: A grounded theory study of legitimacy work among Ethics and Compliance Officers.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 123(2), 186-205.
Tsoukas, H., & Chia, R. (2002). On organizational becoming: Rethinking organizational change.
Organization science, 13(5), 567-582.
Walsh, G., Mitchell, V. W., Jackson, P. R., & Beatty, S. E. (2009). Examining the antecedents and
consequences of corporate reputation: a customer perspective. British Journal of Management,
20(2): 187-203.
Wolbers, J., Boersma, K., & Groenewegen, P. (2018). Introducing a fragmentation perspective on
coordination in crisis management. Organization Studies, 39(11), 1521-1546.
Zavyalova, A., Pfarrer, M. D., Reger, R. K., & Shapiro, D. L. (2012). Managing the message: The effects
of firm actions and industry spillovers on media coverage following wrongdoing. Academy of
Management Journal, 55(5): 1079-1101.

27

POST-SCANDAL ORGANIZATIONAL (DIS)ORDER
TABLE 1:
Participants by Role and Industry
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

MEDIA EVENT
Environmental damage
Bribery
Discrimination
Money laundering
Environmental damage
Child labor abuse
Monopoly behavior
Child labor abuse
Cyberattack
Bribery
Fraud
Accounting failures
Illegal transportation
Bribery
Accounting failures
Tax fraud
Fraud
Fraud
Accounting failures
Money laundering
Fraud
Tax fraud
Production failure
Money laundering
Bribery
Child labor abuse
Bribery

POSITION
Assistant controller
Chief financial officer
Risk manager
Compliance officer
Chief financial officer
Head of global sales
Compliance officer
Chief risk manager
Chief financial officer
VP/Financial controller
Chief sales officer
Global reputational partner
Operations manager
Chief sales manager
Reputational managing partner
Senior global partner
Sales manager
Compliance manager
Managing partner
Chief controller officer
Chief internal auditor
Compliance manager
Operations manager
SVP/Risk manager
SVP/Asset and investments
Global sales manager
VP and controller

INDUSTRY
Equipment and machinery
Heavy construction
Money center bank
Money center bank
Property and casualty insurance
Textiles and apparel (footwear and accessories)
Private equity
Pharmaceutical
Scientific and technical instruments
Personal products
Communications equipment
Accounting advisory services and tax consulting
Air delivery and freight services
Discount and variety stores
Accounting advisory services and tax consulting
Accounting advisory services and tax consulting
Money center bank
Security and protection services
Accounting advisory services and tax consulting
Money center bank
Foreign money center bank
Investment brokerage (national)
Power plants
Accident and health insurance
Asset management
Textiles and apparel (footwear and accessories)
Discount and variety stores
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TABLE 2
Sentiment Analysis Polarities
Overall text
Testimonies Polarity Conf. (%)
1 Positive
55
2 Negative
67
3 Positive
27
4 Neutral
33
5 Negative
55
6 Negative
44
7 Neutral
56
8 Positive
23
9 Negative
59
10 Positive
66
11 Neutral
15
12 Neutral
37
13 Positive
19
14 Negative
57
15 Negative
45
16 Neutral
38
17 Neutral
29
18 Neutral
60
19 Negative
64
20 Positive
25
21 Neutral
28
22 Neutral
45
23 Positive
37
24 Neutral
38
25 Neutral
51
26 Neutral
33
27 Neutral
33
Negative (average)
56
Positive (average)
36
Neutral (average)
38

Event proceedings
Polarity Conf. (%)
Positive
12
Negative
78
Negative
77
Negative
63
Negative
64
Negative
75
Neutral
18
Negative
55
Negative
67
Positive
20
Neutral
27
Neutral
30
Neutral
19
Negative
72
Negative
66
Neutral
30
Negative
59
Neutral
28
Negative
70
Neutral
22
Negative
45
Neutral
49
Positive
17
Negative
78
Neutral
32
Negative
62
Negative
68
66
16
28

Transformation process
Polarity
Conf. (%)
Positive
72
Neutral
54
Positive
70
Positive
69
Positive
60
Positive
56
Neutral
55
Positive
57
Neutral
30
Positive
60
Positive
32
Positive
28
Positive
49
Neutral
67
Negative
57
Positive
33
Neutral
58
Positive
37
Negative
39
Positive
50
Neutral
68
Neutral
33
Positive
66
Positive
67
Neutral
45
Positive
68
Positive
65
48
55
44
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TABLE 3
Taxonomic Triangulation between Manual and Mechanical findings

Finding 1.

Grounded theory themes
Scandalous media episodes
trauma indicators

Finding 1.1.

Shame and humiliation

Finding 1.2.
Finding 1.3.

Remorse and blame
Collective guilt

Finding 1.4.

Executives' fear

Finding 2.
Finding 3.
Finding 4.
Finding 5.
Total word count
Different words

Challenge system trust
Self-regulation for recovery
Changes for safety perception
Fears of subsequent scrutiny
and governance

Example of most repeated mechanic themes (three words)

everybody/people/we was/were affected; company's making
less; our reputation was
was really/severely tough/hard; probably should/could have;
to an innocent/someone/
if we had; we did not; should have stayed
to be treated; compensation/reputation/name wise
everybody; would see/observe us/company
we thought that; sometimes we look/think; no longer
applied/served/worked
To make sure; to ensure that; in compliance with
We had to; needed to adjust; the right thing
We no longer; we're continuously assessing; turn this around

Top-10
themes
frequencies

Relative
frequencies

311

.920%

115
259

.340%
.766%

110

.325%

223
82
153

.660%
.243%
.453%

101
33,797
1,938

.299%
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APPENDIX A:
Interview Protocol
Interview Questions
Introduction (Interviewer): “Hello (name____________). Thank you so much for taking the time to
meet with me today. I really appreciate it. Before getting started, there are a couple of things I would
like to cover.”
Purpose and Format for the Interview (Interviewer): “As part of an investigation, I am interested in
developing a greater understanding reputational risk attributable to affiliated and non-affiliated entities
to your organization. I will ask you a series of open-ended questions on this topic, and I will also ask one
or more follow-up questions as you respond. The interview will last for approximately 60 minutes.”
Confidentiality (Interviewer): “Everything you share in this interview will be kept in strictest
confidence, and your comments will be transcribed anonymously – omitting hour name, anyone else you
refer to in this interview, as well as the name of your current organization and/or past organizations.
Your interview responses will be included with all the other interviews I conduct."
Audiotaping (Interviewer): “To help me capture your responses accurately and without being overly
distracting by taking notes, I would like to record our conversation with your permission. Again, your
responses will be kept confidential. If at any time, you are uncomfortable with this interview, please let
me know and I will turn the recorder off.”
“Do you have any questions before we begin?”
Part 1 – Opening Ice-breaker and Background Questions
Opening Question: Please tell me about yourself, both personally and professionally.
Sample probing questions:
• Can you tell me about your experience background?
• How long have you been part of in this organization?
• How did you obtain this position?
Part 2 - Core Questions - Experiences
Question 1: Please tell me about the time that you have perceived a potential risk to your reputation
triggered by an affiliated entity.
Sample probing questions:
• Tell me about how did you organization handle such event?
• What types of procedures does your organization have before and after?
• What was your overall experience?
• What change inside the organizations after?
• Tell me about who was the most affected?
• Did it lead to a change in management process, procedure, etc.?
Question 2: Please tell me about the time that you have perceived a potential risk to your reputation
triggered by a non-affiliated entity?
Sample probing questions:
• Tell me about how did you organization handle such event?
• What types of procedures does your organization have before and after?
• What was your overall experience?
• What change inside the organizations after?
• Tell me about who was the most affected?
• Did it lead to a change in management process, procedure, etc.?
Other sample probing questions:
• How do you understand reputation risk?
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• Do you have a common definition for reputation risk?
• Please give me some examples reputation.
Part 3 – Closing
Lastly, when you think about reputation risk and what it means to your work, are there any questions you
were expecting me to ask that we have not covered, or do you have anything more to add?
Concluding Statement (Interviewer): That concludes our interview. Thank you very much for all the time
and sharing your insight. I really appreciate your time. If I need to clarify anything we’ve discussed,
would it be okay for me to follow up with a brief phone call or email?
Thank you again, (name________).
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APENDIX B.
Examples of the sentiment analysis (polarities)
Positive polarity

Confidence

It benefits the executives because at least we can feel comfortable, like okay we
can keep our jobs because we feel comfortable that the organization is not
going to engage in something that will put us in a bad situation or jeopardize
our livelihood.

68

A reputation is in my mind something that comes into your head when you hear
the name of our company. We want very much for you to have a positive
association with the name of our firm when you hear it, and we are worried
about any foreseeable outcome where our name is associated with something
bad happening.

48

So we tried to assist them as much as we could, and we are still trying to assist
them in helping them to, depending on their development, depending also on
their sector, depending also on the jurisdiction and what have you, to start to
build up something which allows them at least to have a counter argument in
the case they would be involved in the compliance issue with the regulator.
Neutral polarity

75

What we did not think through was that most sectors did not issue preferred
stocks so it is limited primarily to financials and maybe some telecom and to
the utilities business, so we held a lot of preferred stock paper in the financial
space. We had inadvertently made a sector bet. The global financial crisis hit
the financials the hardest and that wiped out the value of these stocks. Our loss
there was an accident. We didn’t plan to make the sector bet. That is just the
way things turned up.

50

We have already been deploying an FTDA training online as well. Privacy
training, well, anti-bribery, FTDA, and insider trading training. We have a
helpline, whereby people can anonymously communicate any compliance issue
that they face in their business. We have just last year, and also in this year,
deployed a privacy and information security program whereby we have ruled
out certain polices, certain mechanisms, certain additional trainings to make
sure that we are compliant in terms of privacy regulations, especially in Europe.
In terms of information security, that people are aware, what can be done, what
should be stored, what should not be stored, etc. So we have a lot of mechanism
to prevent any wrongdoings aside from regular meetings with the senior guys
whereby if there is an issue, or where there may be an issue that we can discuss
it openly and where people from compliance are also attending this meeting.

48

We did get hurt. We invested in preferred stocks which were concentrated in
financial institutions. We had sector risks, we had not diversified. Indirectly we
have made a big sector bed of financials. In the fall of 2008 we marked down
our portfolio by a billion dollars. As soon as we thought these securities were
impaired we did a market to market impairment.
Negative polarity

48
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Some of the considerations, I think, are is this the first time this has happened?
Is it a reputation issue? What's the impact on the consumer; how are kids going
to respond to this? Do we have all of the information? Is this a point-of-view
issue, is it a human rights issue; what are we dealing with? Those are some of
the lenses that I think we ran that through. First offender, second offender.

84

So what example are you setting for them, the company, the kids, other
athletes? Those are some of the things you have to respond to. It's not
necessarily just about your relationship with that athlete. A lot of things you
have to consider, because a lot of people are impacted by those scenarios.

71

But you always have to think about when you're a global, multi-billion-dollar
company, people are paying attention. The decisions you make impact folks
beyond the company and beyond that athlete. Kids are watching, and you ant
our athletes to be models for kids, right? It's not just kids, its other adults,
anybody who is paying attention.

40
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